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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Stephen Davis appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his "Motion for Injunction Post Conviction." 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On August 9, 2010, Davis filed a pleading entitled "Motion for Injunction 
Post Conviction" ("Motion") in which he appears to seek consideration, or 
reconsideration, of his trial attorney's alleged "gross negligence." (R., pp.1-7.) 
Included within Davis's Motion is a request for counsel "for the limited purpose of 
fully arguing th[e) Motion; or filing an amended U.P.C.P.A., ... and presenting of 
[sic) a prima facia [sic) reason to proceed." (R., p.6.) The district court described 
the course of Davis's case prior to the date he filed the Motion as follows: 
On October 29, 1997, {Davis] was charged with one court of 
rape under Idaho Code§ 18-6101 (3), and lewd conduct with a child 
under sixteen under Idaho Code§ 18-1508. According to Davis, 
sentence was later imposed for sexual battery under Idaho Code 
18-1508A. Sentencing occurred on December 7, 1998 and the 
terms of sentence were for 18 months fixed and 13 years 
indeterminate. On November 9, 1999, {Davis] filed a Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief ("Petition") alleging, among other things, 
ineffective assistance of counsel, discovery of new evidence, 
excessive punishment, habeas corpus, and timeliness. A hearing 
was held concerning Davis's Petition on August 7, 2000. The Court 
issued a Minute Entry and Order on August 10, 2000, which stated 
that Davis's Petition was dismissed. 
(R, p.13.) 
Noting it was "difficult to discern" whether Davis's Motion was intended as 
a "Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief or a Motion to Vacate Judgment 
or a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment," the district court entered a notice of 
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intent to dismiss the Motion, analyzing it as both a successive petition and a 
motion to reconsider. (R., pp.12-21.) Treating the Motion as a successive 
petition, the court advised Davis of its intent to dismiss the "petition" because 
Davis failed to provide "sufficient admissible evidence to support his claims and 
raise a genuine issue of material fact.'' (R., p.21.) The court further advised 
Davis that if he intended his Motion as a request for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b) or 
59(e), the Motion was untimely and Davis "failed to provide any facts that would 
allow the Court to consider granting th[e] Motion." (R., p.20.) The court also 
denied Davis's request for counsel and notified him he had twenty days to 
respond to the court's notice. (R., pp.17-19, 21.) Twenty-five days later, on 
October 12, 2010, the court dismissed Davis's Motion, noting it had received no 
response to the court's notice within the 20-day time period. (R., pp.23-24.) 
Ten days later, on October 22, 2010, Davis filed a "reply" to the court's 
notice of intent to dismiss in which he listed a number of cases for the court to 
review for purposes of "res judicada [sic}," contended he "lacks the mental ability 
to research, file, and litigate, a judicial action," asserted there was some 
unidentified "state created barriers" that violated his due process rights, and 
claimed he raised a genuine issue of material fact based on the "fact, the judges, 
court clerks, and most attorneys of the Sixth District are knowledgable [sic] of the 
misconduct and disbarment of Attorney Souza." (R., pp.25-36.) Davis also 
asked the court to treat his Motion as "a first action, upon the fact no ajudication 
[sic] occurred on prior U.P.C.P.A." (R., p.33.) In conjunction with his "reply," 
Davis filed a motion to reconsider the court's dismissal order claiming "external 
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factors of prison conditions did cause a delay in timely responding," although he 
did not articulate what those conditions were. (R., p.38.) 
The district court thereafter entered a second order dismissing Davis's 
Motion concluding Davis "fail[ed] to show any new or additional information that 
would justify reconsideration of th[e] Court's Intent to Dismiss and prior 
Dismissal." (R., pp.39-40.) Davis timely appealed. (R., pp.42-46.) The State 
Appellate Public Defender initially represented Davis on appeal, but withdrew 
after concluding there was no viable issue to raise on appeal. (R., p.74; 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw, p.9; Order Granting Motion for 
Leave to Withdraw and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule.} Davis, with the 
Court's permission, thereafter filed a pro se "Informal Brief." (Order Granting 
Request for Permission for Filing a Non-Conforming Appellant's Brief.} 
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ISSUES 
Although Davis's brief includes a section entitled "Issues," this section 
does not contain a "short and concise" statement of the issues as required by 
I.AR. 35(a)(4), but instead contains what appear to be Davis' arguments on 
appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.3-4.) The state phrases the issues on appeal as: 
Has Davis failed to establish the district court erred in denying his request 
for counsel or in summarily denying relief on his Motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
Davis Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying His Request 
For Counsel And Denying Relief On His Motion 
A. Introduction 
Davis challenges the district court's denial of his request for counsel to 
represent him on his Motion and the denial of relief on his Motion. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.3-4.) Both of Davis' arguments fail. Application of the law to the facts 
supports the district court's determination that Davis failed to establish the 
possibility of a valid post-conviction claim that would entitle him to the 
appointment of counsel. Davis has also failed to show error in the dismissal of 
his Motion whether treated as a successive petition or a motion for 
reconsideration. 
B. Standard Of Review And Legal Standards Applicable To A District Court's 
Decision To Grant Or Deny A Request For The Appointment Of Counsel 
In Post-Conviction Proceedings 
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is 
governed by I.C. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or deny a request for court-
appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. 
State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 
682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009). The court's discretion is not 
unfettered, however. If the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts 
showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on 
the defendant's behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist 
the petitioner in developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 
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654,152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793,102 P.3d at 1112. 
If, on the other hand, the claims in the petition are so patently frivolous that there 
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with 
the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may deny the 
request for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing 
meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 
P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust, 147 Idaho at 684, 214 P.3d at 670. 
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of 
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to 
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of 
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the 
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be 
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion for 
appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not set 
aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to 
questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 
676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001 ). 
C. Davis Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Request For The 
Appointment Of Counsel To Pursue His Motion Or In The Dismissal Of His 
Motion 
Davis has failed to establish the district court erred in denying his request 
for counsel because, as found by the district court, Davis' Motion, whether 
treated as a successive petition or a motion to reconsider, was frivolous. (R., 
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p.19.) Davis has likewise failed to establish he was entitled to a hearing or any 
other relief on his Motion. 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA") provides: "All 
grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his 
original, supplemental or amended application." I.C. § 19-4908. A successive 
petition is allowed only if "the court finds a ground for relief asserted [in the 
successive petition} which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was 
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application." I.C. § 
19-4908; see also Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 933-34, 801 P.2d 1283, 1284-
85 (1990); Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 496, 887 P.2d 39, 41 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
In interpreting I.C. § 19-4908, Idaho's appellate courts have held that 
"[iJneffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel may provide sufficient 
reason for permitting newly asserted allegations or allegations inadequately 
raised in the initial application to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction 
application." Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 
2008) (footnote omitted) (citing Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 596, 635 P.2d 
955, 960 (1981 ); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. 
App. 1999)). If a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel as a basis for bringing a successive petition, the relevant inquiry is 
"whether the second application has raised not merely a question of counsel's 
performance but substantive grounds for relief from the conviction and sentence." 
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Nguyen, 126 Idaho at 496, 887 P.2d at 41 (quoting Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 
337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 (Ct. App. 1987)). 
It appears from Davis's Motion that he left it in the court's discretion as to 
whether to treat the Motion as a successive petition or a motion to reconsider. 
(See generally R., pp.1-7.) If considered a successive petition, in order to be 
entitled to the appointment of counsel, Davis was required to allege facts 
showing the possibility of a valid claim that was either not raised or was 
inadequately asserted in his original post-conviction action due to the ineffective 
assistance of his original post-conviction attorney. See Swader v. State, 143 
Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007) (counsel must be appointed only if 
petitioner alleges the possibility of a valid claim). Davis failed to do so. Indeed, 
Davis's Motion states no clear claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but 
merely alleges the Idaho State Bar found "J. Souza, act[ed] in 'gross negligence,' 
of his duties and obligations to his clients." (R., p.3.) Moreover, there is no 
evidence that this finding by the Idaho State Bar was even made in relation to 
Davis's case. 
As for a sufficient reason that would justify a successive petition, Davis 
appears to claim he has experienced "procedural hurdles" or "state created 
barriers" and "attorney misconduct by not assisting in presenting first [sic] 
U.P.C.P.A." (R., pp.4-6, 33-34.) Although the "hurdles" and "barriers" to which 
Davis refers are not entirely clear, to the extent he is claiming the "hurdles" or 
"barriers" he faced in pursuing his first post-conviction case are related to his 
"mental ability to research, file, and litigate, a judicial action" (R., p.26), the state 
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is unaware of any basis for concluding this would be a sufficient reason for filing 
a successive petition, particularly since Davis was apparently represented by 
counsel during his first post-conviction action. With respect to Davis's claim that 
his original post-conviction attorney engaged in "misconduct" by "not assisting in 
presenting [his] first" petition, Davis has failed to allege any particular deficiency 
in counsel's representation much less a deficiency adequate to find post-
conviction counsel either failed to raise a claim or inadequately pursued a claim 
that was raised. 
Because Davis has failed to show he raised the possibility of a valid claim 
or a sufficient reason for filing a successive post-conviction petition, he has failed 
to show error in the district court's denial of his request for counsel or the 
summary dismissal of his Motion when considered as a successive petition. 
Davis has likewise failed to show the district court erred in declining to 
reconsider the denial of post-conviction relief. In his Motion, Davis appears to 
request reconsideraiion of the order dismissing his first post-conviction petition 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e) and/or 60(b)(6). (R., p.2.) The district court declined 
to afford Davis relief under either rule because Davis "failed to provide any facts 
that would allow the Court to" do so and because any such request was untimely. 
(R., p.20.) The district court was correct. 
Rule 60(b), I.R.C.P. reads, in relevant part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b ); (3) fraud (whether 
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heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) 
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time, and for reasons (1 ), (2), (3) and (6) not more than 
six (6) months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered 
or taken. 
Although a Rule 60(b) motion may be filed in the context of a post-
conviction case, State v. Heyrend, 129 Idaho 568, 572, 929 P.2d 744 (Ct. App. 
1995), the rule provides a very specific time limit for filing such a motion, i.e., "for 
reasons (1), (2), (3) and (6), [the motion shall be made] not more than six (6) 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." "[T]he 
time requirement set forth in Rule 60(b) is jurisdictional and may not be extended 
'except to the extent and under the conditions stated' in the Rule itself." Miller v. 
Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 348, 924 P.2d 607 (1996). The term "made," as used in 
the rule, requires that the motion be "filed prior to the six month time limit or is 
served within that time period and then filed 'within a reasonable time thereafter."' 
kl (quoting I.R.C.P. 5(d)(1)). 
Davis sought relief under subsection (6) of Rule 60(b) (R., p.2); therefore, 
he was required to file or serve the motion within six months of the date of the 
order he was seeking to reconsider, i.e., the order denying post-conviction relief. 
The order denying post-conviction relief was entered August 10, 2000. (See R., 
p.13.) Davis did not, however, file his Motion until August 9, 2010 (R., p.1), well 
beyond the jurisdictional limit. Thus, even if he had stated an adequate reason 
for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), which he did not, the Motion was untimely. 
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Rule 59(e), l.R.C.P, also contains a time limit. Specifically, a motion filed 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e) to "alter or amend the judgment shall be served not 
later than fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment." Given that Davis' 
Motion was untimely under the more generous timeframe available under Rule 
60(b), it was also untimely under Rule 59(e). The district court correctly 
concluded as much and Davis has failed to establish this was error. 
Because Davis has failed to establish the district court erred in denying his 
request for counsel or in denying his Motion, he is not entitled to any relief on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order 
dismissing Davis's Motion. 
DATED this 2oth day of September, 2011. 
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